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Abstract
The issues raised by the New Political Right and the Moral Majority have over-
lapped in recent political history. Researchers have assumed that a single additive scale 
across conservative issues can identify the base of support for the Moral Majority as an 
organization. We examine general support for the Moral Majority separately from sup-
port for six specific issues: teaching creationism, voluntary public school prayer, mil-
itary defense spending, gun control, pornography and abortion. Data are from a 1982 
random sample of adult respondents from Nebraska (N = 1907).
Overall, support for the Moral Majority organization is low. Discriminant analysis 
identifies fundamentalist and evangelical religious affiliation and Biblical literalism as 
independent predictors of support for the Moral Majority per se. Education increases 
knowledge of the organization, but does not influence support for it. Respondents with 
high income levels are more likely to support the Moral Majority organization. These 
findings contradict theories of both status politics and cultural fundamentalism.
Support for the six specific platform items also varies considerably and is affected 
by religious conservatism and, independently, by other attitudinal and demographic 
indicators including age, sex, income, rural residence, education and perception of de-
clining economic conditions. These patterns do not entirely fit the predictions of status 
politics or cultural fundamentalism theories. Rather, they provide evidence that distinct 
coalitions form on specific issues. Our conclusion is that a simple additive index of sup-
port for the Moral Majority masks these differences and oversimplifies complex pat-
terns of coalitions in the religio-political arena. 
Previous studies of the Moral Majority have relied heavily upon theories of status poli-
tics and cultural fundamentalism. Both positions, as we will discuss in detail, assume that 
conservatism cuts across issues. Indeed, the status politics position suggests that those 
who are economically or socially dispossessed should be opposed to any threat to tradi-
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tionalism, while the cultural fundamentalism argument maintains that a single overarch-
ing worldview accounts for conservatism on a variety of moral issues.
In contrast, we argue that support for the Moral Majority’s sociopolitical positions is 
confined neither to the dispossessed nor to cultural fundamentalists. Although these the-
oretical interpretations cannot be rejected out of hand, both explanations neglect shifting 
coalitions and single issue campaigns. The cultural fundamentalists and the dispossessed 
may form a stable core of support for the Moral Majority, but each separate issue also has 
its own separate constituency. Economically, conservatism favors the wealthy rather than 
the dispossessed. Plowman (1979) argues that the well educated, Catholics, and even fem-
inists may align with the Moral Majority on some issues in its potpourri of”... traditional 
moral and biblical principles.” Catholics, for example, have demonstrated political inter-
ests in religious education and abortion (Granberg 1981). Some segments of the wom-
en’s movement, though bitterly opposed to Falwell’s organization and most of its goals, 
share the Moral Majority’s opposition to pornography (Rubin 1984). Defense industries 
and communities with military bases have economic interests in supporting increased de-
fense spending. The National Rifle Association, supported largely by hunters and hobby-
ists, agrees with the New Religious Right in opposing gun control legislation (Himmel-
stein 1983).
Harper and Leicht (1982, 1984; cf. Gannon 1981) argue that the New Religious Right 
has had less direct political impact than its adherents claim. From this perspective, the 
swing toward conservatism during the 1980s “... extends far beyond the evangelical camp 
which is presumed to be the locus of support for the New Religious Right” (Harper and 
Leicht 1982, p. 1). Indeed, representatives of the political New Right are cited as capitaliz-
ing on funding, connections and skills of the “Christian moral voter” (Jorstad 1981, p. 21; 
quoted in Speer 1984, p. 36). This suggests that major sources of support for conservative 
political causes lie outside the Moral Majority and indeed beyond the confines of evangel-
ical or fundamentalist Christianity.
Methodologically, researchers have commonly combined scores on several items we 
have already cited into a single indicator of support for the Moral Majority “platform” 
(Simpson 1983; Yinger and Cutler 1982). This research strategy assumes that the issues 
form a unidimensional scale which correlates highly with support for the Moral Major-
ity as an organization and, consequently, with the status politics of specific demographic 
groups or a generalized cultural fundamentalism. Simpson (1983, 1985) presents evidence 
that a wide range of Moral Majority issue items can be scaled. However, attitudes toward 
issues may be independent of knowledge of, and attitudes toward, the Moral Majority (cf. 
Harper and Leicht 1982). Shupe and Stacy (1982, 1983, 1984) suggest that support for the 
Moral Majority does not necessarily predict agreement with its stands on the issues.
We separately analyze six issues in three areas which have been researched in the past: 
(I) public school reforms aimed against secular humanism; (2) themes of patriotism in in-
creased military defense spending and noninterventionist stances on gun control; and (3) 
moral proscriptions on pornography and abortion. Our specific hypotheses include the 
following:
1. Support for the Moral Majority as a group will derive primarily from religious con-
servatism as measured by (a) Biblical literalism, or (b) identification with evangeli-
cal or fundamentalist religious groups.
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2. Various interest groups or status groups will align with or disassociate from the 
Moral Majority stance on specific issues. The pattern will reflect not only the predic-
tions of status politics or cultural fundamentalist frameworks, but will also reveal 
shifting coalitions.
Beyond these hypotheses, our work is essentially exploratory. Ad hoc political or his-
torical explanations will be brought to bear in interpreting alignments for specific issues. 
Primarily, we are interested in revealing these shifting patterns and arguing for a multi-
dimensional approach to understanding the political platform of the Moral Majority or 
the New Religious Right.
The New Political Right and the New Religious Right
The New Political Right burst on the national scene soon after Watergate. At first pri-
marily secular, the movement was a diffuse coalition of single-issue groups under the 
aegis of a small number of “core activists” such as Richard Viguerie, Jesse Helms, John 
T. Dolan and Paul Weyrich (Himmelstein 1983). The positions advocated by the New 
Right were often consonant with those of religious conservatives. However, evangelical 
and fundamentalist religious leaders, including Billy Graham and such “televangelists” 
(Hadden and Swann 1981) as Pat Robertson, were not active in the political realm. These 
leaders were more concerned with their traditional charge of saving souls and identify-
ing problems of individual morality than with engineering social change. The birth of the 
Moral Majority in June, 1979 took observers of evangelical and fundamentalist religion by 
surprise (Hill and Owen 1982; Marty 1985).
Initially, the Moral Majority was a single-issue movement focusing on government in-
terference with the operation of independent Christian schools, particularly in Virginia. 
Its co-founder and chief spokesperson, Rev. Jerry Falwell, quickly expanded the agenda 
and forged a strong link between religion and politics aimed at protecting what the orga-
nization called the “Christian Bill of Rights” (Brown 1986). His overall strategy has been 
to work toward governmental policies based upon biblical principles. Many, if not most, 
of the issues in the expanded Moral Majority “platform” had already been raised by the 
New Political Right. Researchers have characterized this platform as including such di-
verse issues as abortion, the equal rights amendment, voluntary school prayer, pornog-
raphy, homosexuality, secular humanism in schools (including the teaching of evolution 
and sex education), drug abuse, atheism, gun control, military defense spending, and the 
protection of Christian school movements (Harper and Leicht 1982; Himmelstein 1983; 
Yinger and Cutler 1982). The Moral Majority contributed a scriptural justification for con-
servative politics and promoted the conservative position through techniques of religio-
political persuasion such as the “Old Time Gospel Hour” on television, direct mailings, 
and personal appearances by Falwell.
After the 1980 and 1984 national elections, the Moral Majority and the New Right 
claimed to have placed Ronald Reagan in the White House and removed a number of lib-
eral U.S. Senators and Representatives from office (Gannon 1981). New Right leader Rich-
ard Viguerie (1981, p. 3) termed the 1980 election the first “modern conservative land-
slide.” Many defeated politicians agreed with this assessment, and President Reagan 
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acknowledged Falwell’s political power by consulting with him on the appointment of 
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Hill and Owen 1982).
Conservative religio-political movements of the past have led to the development of 
theories designed to explain what Lipset and Raab (1978) call the “politics of unreason.” 
More recently, researchers have attempted to apply these theories to the Moral Majority 
as an organization, with little success. Past difficulties in explaining support for the Moral 
Majority may be traced to two problems, one methodological, the other theoretical.
The methodological difficulty lies in reliance in past studies upon sets of religio-polit-
ical issues which presumably tap support for the Moral Majority. Some of these issues do 
not appear in the Christian Bill of Rights, but are instead a part of the broader New Right 
platform. Because the New Religious Right and the secular New Right form a loose coali-
tion, the use of these item sets to measure support for the Moral Majority per se has little 
face validity. Nonetheless, as we review below, the theories guiding most studies assume 
that right-wing politics cut across issues. Our own thesis is that the radical right is not all 
of a piece. Coalitions form and reform around particular issues, and those who support 
the Moral Majority position on one issue may oppose it on another. Thus, one-dimen-
sional explanations are likely to fail. Indeed, Falwell himself discerned the unwieldly and 
contradictory nature of some positions attributed to him by the media (and, we might 
add, by social scientists). In January, 1986, he dissolved the Moral Majority and re-consti-
tuted it as the Liberty Foundation, precisely because of “distortion by the media” of his is-
sues (Time, January 7, 1986; p. 25).
The theoretical difficulties are more complex. Attempts to explain the “politics of 
unreason” have generated two predominant frameworks: status politics and cultural 
fundamentalism.
Status Politics and Cultural Fundamentalism
Beginning with Seymour Martin Lipset (1963) and Daniel Bell (1963), sociologists and 
political scientists have argued that right-wing religio-political movements are symbolic 
responses to status discontent (cf. Gusfield 1966; Lipset and Raab 1978, 1981; Whitt and 
Nelsen 1975). From this perspective, support for the radical right is centered in the “dis-
possessed”( Bell 1962), i.e., groups of people who see their way of life vanishing as a re-
sult of modernism in dress, speech, religion, and sexual relations. As Wood and Hughes 
(1964; cf. Harper and Leicht 1984; Simpson 1985) point out, there are two versions of this 
argument, one based on economic status and the other on a more Weberian “life style” or 
“status group” approach.
Lipset emphasized the economic status argument; to him, the real problem is the de-
clining political and economic influence of the “once hads” or the resentment felt by the 
“never hads” (Lipset and Raab 1978). Such groups go through a process of “status substi-
tution” through which “the cultural trappings of a group stand in for the group and be-
come invested with special significance”( Lipset and Raab 1978, p. 131).
On the other hand, Gusfield’s (1966) analysis of moral or symbolic crusades represents 
the emphasis on lifestyle as opposed to underlying economic and political motivations. 
Status politics is not so much a symbolic response to economic and political interests as it 
is an attempt to buttress a cherished lifestyle against the threat of modernism. Page and 
Clelland (1978) call this the “politics of life-style concern.”
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The status politics argument, in one form or the other, has been used to explain such 
right-wing movements as the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, and McCarthyism 
(Lipset and Raab 1978), the rise of Prohibition (Gusfield 1966) and community campaigns 
against pornography (Zurcher and Kirkpatrick 1976). If the Moral Majority is a product 
of status politics, its adherents and those who support its stands should come dispropor-
tionately from those groups most threatened by the social changes of the recent past (e.g., 
urbanization, detente, changes in family structure and sex roles). Demographically, they 
should be concentrated among the elderly, persons living in rural areas and small towns, 
and those with lower levels of education and economic attainment. Attitudinally, they 
should be those who see their lot in life getting worse, their economic prospects deterio-
rating, or their nation moving toward economic scarcity.
Recent studies (Harper and Leicht 1984; Simpson 1985; Wood and Hughes 1984) have 
suggested that status politics inadequately explains support for the New Religious Right. 
This is particularly true of the economic form of the argument. With the exception of ed-
ucation, socioeconomic variables are poor predictors of Moral Majority support (Harper 
and Leicht 1982, 1984; Tamney and Johnson 1982; Shupe and Stacy 1982, 1983, 1984). In-
deed, the Moral Majority gained prominence at a time when fundamentalism was gain-
ing in power and influence. An alternative explanation, favored by Tamney and John-
son (1982), Wood and Hughes (1984) and others, is that support for the Moral Majority 
stems from cultural and socialization factors and reflects a form of “cultural fundamental-
ism” (Gusfield 1966; Page and Clelland 1978; Harper and Leicht 1984; Wood and Hughes 
1984). Wood and Hughes (1984, p. 89) characterize cultural fundamentalism as involv-
ing “adherence to traditional norms, respect for family and religious authority, asceticism 
and control of impulse.” It is “an unflinching and thoroughly moralistic outlook” which 
ties together various issues of the New Religious Right—alcohol, pornography, and other 
profamily, decency issues.
The sources of cultural fundamentalism should be found in low levels of education, 
rural residence, and especially in involvement in conservative and fundamentalist reli-
gious groups (Wood and Hughes 1984). The cultural fundamentalism argument suggests 
that both education and rural residence produce conservative stances because of social-
ization rather than because of threats to economic and social status. 
In brief, we predict that these two theoretical frameworks assume consistency across a 
range of conservative political issues that may actually attract a variety of coalitions. Sin-
gle indices of these broad-ranging issues cannot summarize general support for the Moral 
Majority organization or the New Religious Right.
Data and Method
Our data were drawn from the 1982 Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey. A 
statewide sample (N = 1907) of non-institutionalized persons aged 18 or above was se-
lected by random digit-dialing procedures and interviewed by telephone (Booth et al. 
1980; Moore 1982). Although the interviews covered many aspects of the quality of life, 
the items of interest for this analysis include: (1) religious preference; (2) demographic 
variables associated with status politics, cultural fundamentalism and political interest 
groups; (3) items tapping perceptions of change in economic prospects and the probabil-
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ity of resource shortages in the United States; (4) knowledge of and support for the Moral 
Majority; (5) attitudes toward issues identified by past researchers as associated with the 
Moral Majority, including voluntary public school prayer, the teaching of creationism, 
governmental regulation of pornography, military spending, gun control, and abortion 
(see Viguerie 1981); and (6) an item designed to measure Biblical literalism as an indicator 
of religious fundamentalism.
Independent Variables
Respondents provided their AGE, SEX (male = 1, female = 0), total family INCOME 
for 1981 in categories, level of EDUCATION by degree completed, and rural or URBAN 
residence (see Table 1). Two binary variables (0,1) were constructed to indicate percep-
tions of social and economic change: STANDARDS, with a value of (1) indicating a per-
ception that general living standards will decrease, and SHORTAGES, with a value of (1) 
indicating a perception that the United States will face severe resource shortages.
Christian religious preference or no religious belief was coded as a series of dummy 
variables contrasted with the residual category of mainline Protestant. Orthodox (Greek, 
Russian, Eastern) Christians and those from outside the Christian religious tradition, in-
cluding Jews and members of non-western religions, were excluded from the analysis. A 
series of dummy variables were constructed which represented (a) NONE (no religious 
preference), (b) CATHOLIC, (c) EVANGELICAL BODIES (including large conservative 
groups such as Baptists), and (d) FUNDAMENTALIST SECTS (including such small un-
compromising groups as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists). Each dummy 
variable was coded (1) and contrasted with Mainline Protestants (0).
A literal interpretation of the Bible and support for the Moral Majority as an organi-
zation are often assumed to go hand-in-hand. We constructed a separate item, LITERAL-
ISM, measuring agreement with the following statement: The Bible is the actual word of 
God and is to be taken literally, word for word. Coding for this variable was as follows: 
Strongly disagree (1); somewhat disagree (2); somewhat agree (3); and strongly agree (4).
Dependent Variables
Respondents were first asked if they had ever heard or read about an organization 
called the Moral Majority. Those who had heard of the organization were then asked if 
they generally approved or disapproved of its goals. As a result, the effects of knowledge 
of the organization can be separated out from those of approval of its activities or specific 
issuers associated with it. Knowledge and approval of the Moral Majority is, logically, an 
intervening variable, dependent with respect to the variables listed above but indepen-
dent with respect to specific issues.
All respondents, even those with no prior knowledge of the Moral Majority as an or-
ganization, were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with six re-
ligio-political issues. Responses were coded into three dependent categories: opposition 
to the Moral Majority position (OPPONENTS); some support for the Moral Majority po-
sition (FELLOW TRAVELERS); and strong support for the position (MORAL MAJORI-
TARIAN). These issues included voluntary public school prayer, the teaching of creation-
ism, military defense spending, gun control, pornography and abortion (see Appendix 
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for wording). Each issue has been associated by researchers with the Moral Majority, al-
though some issues originated in the New Political Right.
Using discriminant analyses, each dependent variable is at the nominal level of mea-
surement and their numerical categories are not theoretically or statistically assumed to 
be ordered on any continuum. Discriminant analysis (Klecka 1980) creates one or more 
linear combinations of independent variables which best predict the category of the de-
pendent variable in which the case appears. If there is only one significant function, then 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is adequately ex-
pressed by a single linear combination of the independent variables. If more than one sta-
tistically significant function is found in the analysis, then additional orthogonal continua 
are needed to account for the relationship. Since our dependent variables have three cate-
gories, a maximum of two separate discriminant functions is possible.
The standardized discriminant function coefficients in these analyses, presented in Ta-
bles 2 through 5, are similar to standardized regression coefficients, indicating the relative 
loading of the independent variables defining the function. The structure coefficients rep-
resent the zero-order correlations of the independent variables with the function (Klecka 
1980). In path analytic terms, the structure coefficients give the total association, while 
the standardized discriminant function coefficients estimate direct effects. Given the large 
sample size, we treated coefficients of .10 or above as substantive.
The group centroids (also presented in Tables 2 through 5) provide a second set of in-
dicators for discriminant analysis. These coefficients indicate the place along the contin-
uum defined by the significant functions where each category of the dependent variable 
appears. Finally, the canonical correlations provide estimates of how well each function 
discriminates among dependent variable categories.
Knowledge of and Support for the Moral Majority
First, what was the extent of knowledge and support for the Moral Majority? Ap-
proximately 56 percent of the sample had heard or read of the Moral Majority (see Ta-
ble 1). Of these, 23 percent (244 respondents) approved of the organization and its general 
goals. Another 26 percent did not know whether they approved or disapproved, but had 
heard of the organization. However, most of those who had heard of the Moral Majority 
“mostly disapproved” of its goals. Out of the total sample of respondents, only 12.8 per-
cent “mostly approved” of the Moral Majority.
Table 2 presents a discriminant analysis of sources of knowledge of and support for 
the Moral Majority as an organization. In this analysis, knowledge and support are coded 
into three dependent variable categories: (0) no knowledge of the Moral Majority, (1) 
know of, but mostly disapprove of the Moral Majority, and (2) know of and support the 
Moral Majority.
The first function distinguishes those who have not heard of the organization from 
those who are aware of the Moral Majority but who mostly disapprove of the organiza-
tion. The dominant indictor of awareness and disapproval is educational level. The sec-
ond function, which is also significant, primarily distinguishes between respondents who 
approve and those who disapprove of the Moral Majority. The major factors in this equa-
tion are religious preference and belief; Catholics, members of fundamentalist sects and 
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Biblical literalists are most likely to be supportive, while those claiming no religious pref-
erence are most likely to disapprove. By and large, this second function appears to tap 
cultural fundamentalism.
Nonetheless, the emergence of two functions in this analysis indicates that Biblical lit-
eralism is not the only source of support for the Moral Majority. This further encourages 
our search for varying patterns of support across issues.
Stands on the Issues
The analyses which follow evaluate support of the Moral Majority position on six re-
ligio-political issues. Respondents were asked their opinions even if they indicated no 
prior knowledge of the Moral Majority. Separate indicators of belief in Biblical literalism, 
Table 1. Knowledge and Approval of the Moral Majority
 Heard/ Read Mostly Number of
 About M. M. Approve Respondents
Sex
 Male 61.8 4.0 914
 Female 51.3 11.7 986
 Religion
 Protestant 57.0 11.2 987
 True Sect 64.2 33.8 68
 Established Sects 52.0 17.5 160
 Catholic 51.0 10.0 485
 None 68.2 6.5 93
Residence
 Rural Farm 51.6 12.2 288
 Rural Non-Farm 59.6 19.3 119
 Urban (Pop. < 100,000) 50.9 11.9 877
 Urban (Pop. > 100,000) 67.5 13.4  613
Education
 Less Than High School 28.5 7.2 343
 High School 55.2 12.7 1151
 Junior College 68.0 24.2 95
 Bachelor’s (+) 87.8 16.4 311
Age
 18-24 54.0 12.7 322
 25-40  65.6 14.8 623
 41-55 58.3 12.6 435
 56 + 44.9 10.5 515
Total 56.2 12.8 1907
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knowledge of the Moral Majority, and approval of the Moral Majority were included as 
independent variables. The direction and placement of the centroids indicates the location 
and relationship to the discriminant functions (not necessarily linear) of the dependent 
categories of OPPONENTS, FELLOW TRAVELERS, and MORAL MAJORITARIANS.
Public Schools and the Moral Majority
Two educational issues are near the heart of the Moral Majority platform on public ed-
ucation and secular humanism: ensuring voluntary prayer and teaching creationism in 
the public schools. Two significant discriminant functions appear on the issue of school 
prayer, indicating a more complex support base than religious fundamentalism alone. 
The first function shows greater support for school prayer among older respondents, 
members of evangelical and fundamentalist bodies, those who know about and generally 
Table 2. Discriminant Analysis of Approval of the Moral Majority (N = 1328)
 Function 1 Function 2
 Standardized Structure Standardized Structure
Predictors	 Coefficient	 Coefficient	 Coefficient	 Coefficient
Age -.082 -.007 -.153 -.156
Sex .192 -.015 .125 .050
Education .713 -.038 .028 -.033
Urban .153 -.027 .030 -.026
Income .228 -.050 .209 .133
Religion (Departure from
mainline Protestant)
 True Sect .248 -.064 .576 .517
 Established Sect .075 .009 .217 .110
 Catholic -.106 .013 .067 .487
 None .122 .007 -.267 -.417
Standard .092 -1.000 .158 . 158
Shortages -.043 -.411 -.026 .074
Literalism -.298 .016 .557 .549
Canonical Correlation .457 (p 5 .001) .181 (p 5 .001)
 (88.60%)  (11.40%)
Group Centroids N First Function Second Function
Never Heard 687 -.488 .014
Mostly Disapprove 437 .618 -.206
Mostly Approve 204 .257 .386
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approve of the Moral Majority, and Biblical literalists. Higher income and education lev-
els predict opposition to public school prayer on this first function. Note that on this func-
tion FELLOW TRAVELERS are positioned closely to the MORAL MAJORITARIANS in 
their support of this issue.
On the second function, the FELLOW TRAVELERS group centroid shifts to a position 
closer to the OPPONENTS. FELLOW TRAVELERS resemble opponents of school prayer 
and are distinguished from MORAL MAJORITARIANS by higher education and income, 
membership in evangelical bodies, and concern about shortages and standards of living. 
Males, Catholics, and those with no religious preference are also less likely to support 
the Moral Majority on the school prayer issue. Interestingly, resistance to the Moral Ma-
joritarian stance is influenced by the knowledge variable, indicating that having heard or 
read of the Moral Majority predicts disagreement with its position on school prayer. Sup-
port for the Moral Majoritarian position is predicted by rural residence, membership in 
fundamentalist sects and Biblical literalism, again a cultural fundamentalist pattern.
Table 3. Discriminant Analysis of Support for the Moral Majority Position on Public Prayer and 
Teaching Creationism
              Public Prayer Creationism
                         Function 1            Function 2                              Function 1                   Function 2
Predictors	 																																													[Standardized	Coefficient]	 																																						[Standardized	Coefficient]
Age .537 (.551)1 -.017 (-.023) .020 (.050) .220 (.293)
Sex .073 (-.044) .112 (.105) -.168 (-.202) -.110 (-.235)
Education -.189 (-.494) .133 (-.013) -.079 (-.226) -.108 (-.422)
Urban .062 (-.118) -.467 (-.410) -.067 (-.169) -.175 (-.267)
Income -.127 (-.304) .153 (.098) .051 (-.093) -.099 (-.288)
Religion (Departure from
Mainline Protestant)
 Fundamentalist Sects .145 (.202) -.397 (-.511) .271 (.419) -.243 (-.298)
 Evangelical Bodies .266 (.290) .342 (.264) .174 (.232) .270 (.266)
 Catholic .106 (-.010) .173 (.172) .153 (-.017) .238 (.269)
 None -.031 (-.220) .144 (.081) .078 (-. 127) -.273 (-.392)
Standard .011 (-.012) .134 (.218) .026 (-.006) -.143 (-.090)
Shortages .000 (.047) .311 (.360) -.1 10 (-.049) .291 (.286)
Approve M.M. .344 (.171) .181 (-.117) .396 (.448) -.092 (-.359)
Knowledge .389 (.439) .576 (.413) -.011 (.088) .506 (.720)
Literalism .462 (.667) -.359 (-.271) .803 (.852) .007 (.212)
Canonical Correlation .419 (p≤ .001) .148 (p≤.01) .518 (p≤5.001) .229 (p≤.001)
 (90.42%) (9.58%) (86.86%) (13.14%)
Group Centroids N Function 1 Function 2 N Function 1 Function 2
Opponents 749 -.356 .059 476 -.590 -.297
Fellow Travelers 438 .480 .020 640 .138 .257
Moral Majoritarians 78 .898 -.778 144 1.345 -.136
1 Structure Coefficient
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We next assessed support for the Moral Majority position on the teaching of creation-
ism in public schools. This analysis also yields two significant discriminant functions (Ta-
ble 3). The first, which indicates support for the Moral Majority position, is predominately 
affected by Biblical literalism and approval of the Moral Majority. Support is also pre-
dicted by membership in evangelical bodies and fundamentalist sects. Gender is the only 
other significant demographic factor, with females somewhat more opposed than males 
to the teaching of creationism once other factors are controlled.
The second discriminant function reveals a significant (p ≤ .001) orthogonal linear 
combination of the independent variables. The group centroids describe MORAL MA-
JORITARIANS as similar to OPPONENTS, indicating that these two groups are undif-
ferentiated on this function. FELLOW TRAVELERS are older respondents, Catholics, 
evangelicals, persons concerned about economic shortages, and respondents who have 
knowledge of the Moral Majority. It is interesting to note that the number of respondents 
represented in this group is considerably greater than in the other public school issue (640 
respondents compared to 438 FELLOW TRAVELERS for public school prayer). The sec-
ond function suggests that FELLOW TRAVELERS who are not closely aligned with fun-
damentalism, Biblical literalism or approval of the Moral Majority provide some support 
for the Moral Majoritarian stand on this particular school issue.
Overall, however, both of these public school items yield strong first discriminant 
functions (explaining 42 to 52 percent of the variance) with Biblical literalism and ap-
proval of the Moral Majority as major predictors of a Moral Majoritarian stance. The de-
mographic variables are generally weaker predictors, but their coefficients suggest that 
the elderly, low income, poorly educated and rural respondents align with the Moral Ma-
jority on this cluster of educational issues. This may represent a status politics phenome-
non. If so, however, it is exceedingly weak in comparison to cultural effects.
Defense Spending and Gun Control
Males and supporters of the Moral Majority as an organization are significantly more 
likely to support increases in defense spending and to oppose gun control. But substan-
tive differences are evident on the issues. Table 4 shows the two significant discriminant 
functions generated for defense spending. On the first function, the single most impor-
tant factor predicting support is Biblical literalism. Males also support increased spend-
ing, as do those who indicate less concern about future deterioration of living standards 
and shortages. The first function strongly differentiates MORAL MAJORITARIANS from 
both OPPONENTS and FELLOW TRAVELERS.
On the second military spending function, the FELLOW TRAVELERS realign with 
MORAL MAJORITARIANS. Support is predicted by age, gender (male), higher income, a 
perception that resources and standards of living will erode in the future, and knowledge 
and approval of the Moral Majority. In contrast, higher education levels, membership in 
fundamentalist sects and no religious preference predict opposition to increased military 
spending. Unlike the first equation, Biblical literalism has no consistent effect on this func-
tion, but knowledge and approval of the Moral Majority are significant predictors of sup-
port. This second function highlights the divergence of Biblical literalists and members of 
fundamentalist sects from the Moral Majority platform on specific issues. Moreover, the 
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support of high-income respondents for increased defense spending contradicts both the 
status politics and cultural fundamentalism theories.
The gun control issue is dominated by a single significant equation, with males and 
rural respondents showing strong opposition to legal control (Table 4). Membership in 
fundamentalist sects, approval of the Moral Majority, age and higher income levels also 
load on this function. Literalism is unrelated to support. Catholic religious preference pre-
dicts some level of opposition to the Moral Majority platform, as does knowledge of the 
Moral Majority. This function yields a linear assessment of support for the Moral Major-
ity position.
The lack of a relationship between Biblical literalism and one’s position on gun con-
trol and the opposition of members of fundamentalist sects to increased military spend-
ing revealed in the second function suggests that these are multidimensional, often secu-
lar issues. Where knowledge and approval of the Moral Majority are significant factors, 
the Biblical literalism variable shows no effects, and vice versa. Moreover, gender shows 
a consistent pattern; males support defense increases and oppose gun control. Knowledge 
of the Moral Majority is not a straightforward indicator of opposition to gun control.
Table 4. Discriminant Analysis of Support for the Moral Majority Position on Military Defense and 
Gun Control
                                              Military Defense                                        Gun Control
                     Function 1    Function 2           Function 1          Function 2
Predictors																																					[Standardized	Coefficient]																															[Standardized	Coefficient]
Age -.090 (-.063)1 .334 (.388) .143 (.158) .388 (.330)
Sex .123 (.103) .334 (.293) .702 (.709) .026 (.050)
Education -.028 (-.114) -.211 (-.246) -.121 (.008) -.272 (-.166)
Urban .192 (.067) .050 (-.053) -.560 (-.537) .171 (.245)
Income .015 (-.054) .537 (.404) .146 (.192) .146 (.132)
Religion
 Fundamentalist Sects -.151 (.106) -.163 (-.142) .117 (.137) -.215 (-.359)
 Evangelical Bodies -.050 (.047) .061 (.053) .072 (.048) .348 (.249)
 Catholic .126 (.049) .086 (.130) -.195 (-.271) .059 (.024)
 None .122 (.007) -.207 (-.320) -.047 (-.021) .220 (.233)
Standard -.205 (-.321) .264 (.327) .010 (.041) .360 (.332)
Shortages -.290 (-.353) .165 (.252) .004 (-.032) -.049 (.091)
Approve M.M. .062 (.173) .403 (.194) .164 (.289) .313 (.134)
Knowledge -.164 (-.019) .545 (.360) -.242 (-.314) .239 (.038)
Literalism .965 (.827) .098 (.207) -.077 (.008) -.657 (-.590)
Canonical Correlation .239 (p≤ .001) .158 (p≤ .01) .351 (p≤ .001) .130
 (70.44%) (29.56%) (89.13%) (10.87%)
Group Centroids N Function 1  Function 2 N Function 1 Function 2
Opponents 449 -.130 -.280 633 -.379 -.050
Fellow Travelers 636 -.058 .153 474 .263 .146
Moral Majoritarians 181 .500 .128 161 .576 -.241
1 Structure Coefficient
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Pornography and Abortion
In these two analyses, the first function identifies linear support for Moral Majority posi-
tions on pornography and abortion. The second function differentiates the FELLOW TRAV-
ELERS, realigning them with OPPONENTS. Opposition to pornography is predicted on 
the first function by age, sex, literalism, knowledge and approval of the Moral Majority. 
Women, the elderly and Biblical literalists are more likely to support the Moral Majority po-
sition on pornography while persons with no religious preference are likely to oppose it.
Two aspects of the pornography equations are important. First, the Fellow Travelers 
and Moral Majoritarians have substantially increased in numbers to 506 and 354 respon-
dents, respectively. Second, the pornography issue, in its contemporary state, has drawn 
support not only from the New Religious Right, but also from feminist and other political 
groups which identify pornography as violence against women rather than as an issue of 
sexual morality. Thus, the first function may combine two distinct support populations. 
The second function, with a canonical correlation of .128, barely misses the .05 level of sig-
nificance. However, it does suggest that Fellow Travelers are distinguished from Moral 
Table 5. Discriminant Analysis of Support for the Moral Majority Position on Pornography, 
Abortion
                                     Pornography                                             Abortion
                      Function 1    Function 2         Function 1           Function 2
Predictors	 																							[Standardized	Coefficient]	 													[Standardized	Coefficient]
Age .643 (.627)1 -.122 (-.239) -.142 (-.173) .378 (.380)
Sex -.418 (-.445) -.153 (-.129) -.161 (-.220) -.143 (-.118)
Education -.034 (-.300) .183 (.238) .031 (-.120) -.304 (-.146)
Urban .017 (-.116) .404 (.433) .020 (-.059) .417 (.341)
Income .109 (-.063) .006 (.034) -.137 (-.184) .496 (.377)
Religion (Departure from
Mainline Protestant)
 Fundamentalist Sects .078 (.155) .169 (.174) .157 (.225) .162 (.210)
 Evangelical Bodies .363 (.087) .304 (.311) .215 (.193) .161 (.200)
 Catholic .180 (.095) .076 (-.072) .580 (.477) -.139 (-.260)
 None -.112 (-.322) .399 (.356) -.029 (-.229) .190 (.113)
Standard -.015 (-.024) -.485 (-.495) -.019 (-.028) -.142 (-.202)
Shortages -.004 (.031) -.106 (-.313) -.007 (.032) -.196 (-.289)
Approve M.M. .325 (.175) .149 (.289) .622 (.595) -.188 (.008)
Knowledge .315 (.348) -.239 (-.358) .102 (-.023) -.357 (-.188)
Literalism .475 (.590) .340 (.203) .429 (.509) .492 (.404)
Canonical Correlation .498 (p ≤ .001) .128  .268 (p ≤ .001) .150 (p ≤ .01)
 (95.18%) (4.82%) (77.22%) (22.78%)
Group Centroids N Function 1 Function 2 N Function 1 Function 2
Opponents 439 -.704 .150 948 -.150 .028
Fellow Travelers  506 .135 -.175 228 .295 -.264
Moral Majoritarians 354 .738 .057 96 .769 .360
1 Structure Coefficient
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Majoritarians through a number of demographic factors, including age, sex, education, 
urban residence and sectarianism.
On the issue of abortion, women are more likely than men to support the position 
of the Moral Majority, when other factors are controlled (Table 5). Biblical literalism, ap-
proval of the Moral Majority, Catholic religious preference, sectarian membership, age 
and income are also substantively significant. Younger respondents and those with lower 
income levels oppose the Moral Majority position. The number of OPPONENTS has in-
creased substantially. More respondents (948) oppose the Moral Majority on abortion 
than on any other issue included in the analysis.
The second function primarily differentiates the FELLOW TRAVELERS as a group. 
Biblical literalism, sect membership, no religious preference, urban residence, more ad-
vanced age and higher incomes distinguish strong from more marginal supporters. 
Women, those with lower educational levels, Catholics, respondents who are concerned 
about shortages and eroding standards of living, as well as those without knowledge of 
the Moral Majority, are more likely to be FELLOW TRAVELERS. The analysis suggests 
that the Moral Majority stance does not represent any clear status group on the issue of 
abortion. This second function accounts for fifteen percent of the variance in abortion atti-
tudes, highlighting the variability in support patterns.
Conclusions
Support for the Moral Majority per se is given by only 12 percent of the sample, which 
is less than that for specific religious and political issues associated with the Moral Major-
ity platform. At the time of the survey, the position of the Moral Majority was “strongly” 
supported by the largest percentage of respondents on the issues of pornography (27 per-
cent), military spending (15.4 percent), gun control (14.3 percent) and ranged downward 
to only 7.5 percent strong approval of their abortion stance. Knowledge and approval of 
the Moral Majority are influenced by Biblical literalism and fundamentalist or evangelical 
religious preferences. The primary predictor of approval of the Moral Majority is knowl-
edge of the organization.1
While knowledge and approval predict political and religious attitudes, they do have 
independent effects. Thus, they are separate dimensions. Support for the Moral Majority 
loads significantly on all first functions except military defense spending. Biblical literal-
ists support the Moral Majority as an organization, but differ with it on specific issues, es-
pecially gun control. Thus, not all Moral Majoritarians are Biblical literalists, and not all 
Moral Majoritarians ( or literalists)have similar views on specific issues.
Overall, the religious bases of support for political stands taken by the Moral Majority or-
ganization are clearest on the public school issues of creationism and voluntary prayer. The 
remaining issues draw support from more diverse demographic and interest groups. Males 
supported military defense spending and unrestricted access to guns; females were against 
pornography and abortion. Urban, highly educated and high income respondents took con-
servative stances on some items, particularly abortion and military defense; yet persons 
in these same categories opposed government restriction of pornography. These patterns 
vary, and support for the Moral Majority per se by these same groups is weak. Other interest 
groups, including the gun lobby, business interests in metropolitan areas, and perhaps even 
feminists advocating restriction of pornography, seem to shift from pro- to anti-Moral Ma-
Multiple DiMensions of the Moral Majority platforM     437
jority stances on specific issues rather than accepting its entire platform. To the extent that 
there is a single unifying basis of support across issues, it appears to rise from membership 
in conservative and literalist religious groups. However, shifting interest group coalitions 
are evidently the driving force behind the resurgence of political conservatism.
Support for the Moral Majority as an organization is far weaker and more varied than 
its leaders would have us believe. Its pronouncements on religio-political issues appear to 
have had little effect on stands taken on issues of military defense, gun control, pornog-
raphy and abortion. Support from cultural fundamentalists and the dispossessed is most 
evident on the educational issues of school prayer and teaching creationism.
Because these support patterns vary, it is empirically questionable to combine sepa-
rate items from the Moral Majority platform into a single scale measuring support for the 
Moral Majority. It is also politically inadvisable to assume that religious sectarianism and 
Biblical literalism are the sole cornerstones of support for Moral Majoritarian or New Re-
ligious Right issues among the general public.
Theories in the sociology of religion which seek to account for a rise in conservatism 
and support for political activism among the economically or culturally threatened must 
be refined. How can we account for the positions of the economically privileged on spe-
cific issues, or even their unpredicted support for the Moral Majority organization? What 
accounts for the gender differences in support for military defense spending, gun con-
trol, abortion and pornography? Are these mere reflections of sex role socialization, or 
do they identify some fundamental difference in moral frameworks between women and 
men which go beyond conservative or fundamentalist religiosity? Finally, will the align-
ments indicated by these issue-specific analyses add to the conservative religious baseline 
of support for groups such as the Moral Majority or the Liberty Foundation? Or will the 
shifting sands of interest group politics erode these organizations in the future? An ex-
panded view of organizational platforms and support systems may help to answer these 
questions in the decades ahead.
Appendix 
Questionnaire Items for Moral Majority Issues
1982 Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey
Now I would like to ask you some questions about some current issues. Do you strongly agree, 
agree, disagree or strongly disagree* with each of the following statements:
The public schools should conduct prayers as part of their official business.
The government should do whatever is necessary to eliminate all pornography such as X-rated 
movies and pornographic bookstores.
The United States should increase spending for military defense.
The country would be better off if we had strict gun control laws.**
The public schools should teach students that the universe was created by God as described in 
the Bible.
Whether to have an abortion is strictly a private decision, which the government should not try 
to regulate in one way or another.**
*Discriminant categories were coded: strongly agree (2), somewhat agree (1), somewhat disagree, strongly dis-
agree (0).
**Responses to these questions were reversed for analysis.
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Note
1. This may be an artifact. Only those who know about the Moral Majority are asked if they approve 
of the organization.
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